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National Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo.

1973)*
By

MARYANN WALSH**
INTRODUCTION

On September 24, 1973, the Colorado Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of lex loci delicti for multistate tort actions in
Colorado. First National Bank v. Rostek' provided the court with
an opportunity to consider whether Colorado courts were compelled to apply lex loci to determine the proper choice of law. The
supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
the defendant, Rostek, and announced not only the choice of law
rule for the Rostek question, but also the principles to be applied
to all subsequent multistate tort cases in Colorado.
A careful examination of the Rostek decision and its underlying policy is important in assessing its impact on future Colorado
conflict of law multistate tort cases. This article will first analyze
the background of the alternative choice of law approaches which
were available to the Rostek court. Second, the precise choice of
law rules selected and applied in Rostek will be considered.
Third, it is suggested that the Rostek decision is representative
of the governmental interest analysis. And finally, the effect of
the Rostek rules on subsequent choice of law questions in Colorado will be assessed.
I.

ALTERNATIVE CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES

AVAILABLE TO THE

Rostek COURT
The Colorado court was not in the vanguard of a novel approach to conflict of law multistate tort problems in seeking an
alternative to lex loci.' Discontent with the rigidity of lex loci has
been prevalent for the last two decades among both academicians
and judges.' Babcock v. Jackson, a 1963 New York decision, out* The author acknowledges with appreciation the initial inspiration, instruction, and
persistence of Professor Samuel D. Cheris, Associate, Yegge, Hall, & Evans, Denver,
Colorado; B.S., 1967, Brooklyn College; M.B.A., J.D., 1971, Stanford University.
** Clerk to Judge Robert H. McWilliams, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; A.B.,
1970, Trinity College; J.D., 1974, University of Denver College of Law.
514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
See id., at 317 n.3 for a list of state decisions abandoning lex loci.
See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933),
for an early discussion of theoretical approaches to conflict of law principles. "Modern"
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lined the range of choice of law theories proposed and the difficulties inherent in supplanting lex loci.' Babcock was distinctive as
the first case to reject lex loci and to adopt an alternative rule5
relying on elements of the major policy approaches to choice of
law questions.
Judge (later Chief Judge) Fuld posed the question: "Shall
the law of the place of the tort invariably govern"' the available
relief for that tort? That was the essence of lex loci as incorporated in section 384 of the Restatement (First)Conflict of Laws
and this rule had been the absolute determinant of the proper
choice of law.
The origin of the lex loci delicti doctrine rested on the concept that where the law of more than one state was, or might be,
involved in a tort action, the law of the state where the parties'
rights vested should control.7 In a tort action the vesting of rights
and the cause of action occurred at the place of the wrong, for only
there did one party acquire a right against the other.' The place
of the wrong was almost always the place where the tortious conduct also occurred. Invoking lex loci to select the applicable law
resulted in relative uniformity and predictability, but its mechanical application sometimes created inequitable consequences
both for the parties and for the states involved.'
Previously, New York courts and other jurisdictions had circumvented the harshness of a lex loci application through avoidance techniques. 9 By characterizing conflicts problems as procedural rather than substantive questions, for example, the court
could avoid lex loci without squarely overruling it." But the
interest in lex loci substitutes began with Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Id. at 480-82, 191 N.E.2d 283-84, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 748-49. The court discusses the move
away from lex loci in other areas of law (e.g., contracts), but not, prior to this, in torts.
Id. at 477, 191 N.E.2d 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d 746.
For an excellent discussion of the lex loci doctrinal development beginning with its
origins in 13th century Italy and culminating in the Restatement formulations, see Sedler,
Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of
Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 29-63 (1967).
Justice Holmes is credited with articulating the vested rights approach in tort cases
in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
1 One commentator characterized lex loci as not only "mechanical" but also
"wooden" and "ossified." See Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 202, 204 (1969).
'" See Carpenter, New Trends in Conflicts Rules Affecting Torts: A Chronological
Review, 1 LOYOLA U.L.J. 187, 208-09 (1970).
" Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961).
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Babcock court ventured into new legal territory when it abandoned lex loci and held that "the [traditional] rule, formulated
as it was by the courts, should be discarded."'"
Having displaced lex loci, the next problem was what should
determine the proper choice of law when laws conflicted. Prior to
Babcock, agitation to supplant lex loci had resulted in two different proposed approaches: either lex loci should be replaced by a
more sophisticated, though flexible, rule; or, alternatively, choice
of laws should not be governed by a priori rules but rather by
3
reference to policy-oriented approaches.'
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is representative of the former view, structured on flexible rules which consider
the "most significant contacts" between the interested states and
the parties.'4 The latter approach is best presented by the governmental interest analysis.' 5 This theory stresses ad hoc adjudication and refers to underlying state policies to determine that state
which seems to possess a superior interest in having its law applied.
These alternatives were both utilized in Babcock which
made the breakthrough from lex loci to policy considerations in
a tort action involving a host and a guest, both New York domiciliaries, who were injured in an auto accident in Ontario, Canada.
New York had no guest statute, whereas Ontario had a strict
guest law barring recovery. The New York court applied the law
'2 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 751-52.
,3 Sedler, supra note 7, at 41-42.
"1In an attempt to underline the policy foundations of the definitive Restatement
Second rules, Willis Reese, the Restatement reporter, emphasized that "[riules are the
product of policies, and it is unwise to seek to formulate a rule until the nature and range
of the policies it embodies are well understood." Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 333 (1972).
,1 Professor Brainerd Currie was the first to articulate the governmental interests
approach and his writings offer a cogent explanation of the method. See Currie, Survival
of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205
(1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958). See also Currie, Conflict, Crisis and
Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of
Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1961); Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict of Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958); Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171; Currie, The Constitutionand the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HI-Rv. L. REv. 36 (1959); Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 258 (1961); Currie &
Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28
U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960).
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of New York, which was not the place of injury, after considering
the facts with direct regard to policies motivating the respective
forums' laws. The jurisdiction which had an overriding interest
in asserting its law was the determining factor. By grouping the
"most significant contacts" which both New York and Canada
had with the incident without isolating and weighing each element, the court assessed the competing interests and found:"
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" . . . may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or
the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised
in the litigation. . . .[This rule] thereby allows the forum to apply
"the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the
outcome of [the] particular litigation.' ",17

This language indicates that the court concentrated on two factors: significant contacts and policy. These factors act as the
basis, respectively, of the Restatement Second approach and of
the governmental interests analysis.
The court acknowledged the emphasis it placed on the
Restatement Second by grouping contacts. Specifically, the court
referred to section 145 of the Restatement. 8 This section, which
encompasses all tort actions, dictates that the law of the state
"with the most significant relationship" to the occurrences and
parties shall govern. Facts of the particular situation are matched
to a set of broad choice of law principles to ascertain the state
with the dominant interest. Section 6 of the Restatement Second
sets forth the following goals to be attained in isolating the "most
significant contacts":
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems;
(b) the relevant policies of the forum;
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
(d) the protection of justified expectations;
(e) the basis of policies underlying the particular field of law;
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of results; and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.

Section 145 incorporates these more abstract policy considerIt is important to distinguish the Restatement Second's use of "contacts" from the
governmental interest's use of the term. Although Babcock looks to the "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contacts," this involves an analysis of circumstances and policies rather
than a counting by number of the state connections. See Carpenter, supra note 10, at 225.
'7 12 N.Y.2d at 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749.
Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749-50.
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ations of section 6 by requiring that the rights and liabilities of
the parties be decided "under the principles stated in section
six." However, the means for identifying the proper law is a set
of four precise "contacts.""9 Part 2 of section 145 gives substance
to an otherwise pure policy approach by specifying that each tort
issue be examined with respect to:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties; and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.

While the Restatement was designed to look to the factual
context only after a proper obeisance to all the policies involved,
the practical approach would be to count contacts and forego the
more difficult policy analysis. Therefore, the Restatement
Second, which was hoped to be a workable coordination of rules
and policy, is highly susceptible of becoming as inflexible as lex
loci. 0
The Babcock court hesitated to use the Restatement as an
absolute rule, but rather regarded the separate contacts only in
comparison to the issue presented and the relative interests of
New York and Ontario. By looking to the scope of interests, rather
than to individual factual elements, the Babcock court relied on
the policy approach alternative to lex loci." After considering the
policy bases of the New York and Ontario legislatures in extending or denying coverage to guests, the jurisdiction with the
stronger interest was found to be New York. This court's examination of legislative policy was a clear example of the interest
analysis method.
A policy approach replaces traditional choice of laws concepts with an ad hoc view of the states' policies, parties' expecta" Although the incorporation of section 6 in section 145 of the Restatement Second
is an effort to combine abstract and substantive considerations, the comprehensiveness
of section 145 is limited by a notable deficiency. "Although it is printed in black letters,
section 145 is not much of a rule since it fails to offer a definition of the central word
'significant.' Thus the Restatement provisions on tort choice of law appear to be programmatic rather than normative." Juenger, supra note 9, at 212.
2"

Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,

28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 700, 705 (1963). See also in this issue, Nanda, A Positive but

Uncertain Step Forward for Choice of Law Problems in Colorado: The Rostek Decision,
51 DENVER L.J. 587 (1974).
2, 12 N.Y.2d at 482-84, 191 N.E.2d 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749-51.
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tions, or inherent "best" aspects of the law involved in each true
conflicts case. 2 The most prominent policy approach is that of
governmental interests analysis which was initially postulated by
Professor Brainerd Currie and later refined by other choice of law
authorities.13 The Babcock decision was the first judicial recognition of the interest analysis approach."
The foundation for governmental interest considerations was
suggested by decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
1930's. In two cases, the Court held that a state court, applying
its own law in multistate cases, must establish that the facts of
the case bring it within the state's interest to enforce local law.2 5
Absent such a showing, a court's action violates the due process
and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution. 6 States were
compelled, therefore, to determine and articulate their own interests before accepting a choice of law rule. Currie's governmental
interest theory provided some criteria by which to identify true
conflicts problems, to recognize state interests, and to compare
competing state interests.'
The Babcock holding was a recognizable product of the interest analysis technique:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New
York and Ontario

. .

. vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it

cle'ar that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater
and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal.2

While the Babcock decision did not detail the range of approaches suggested to supplant lex loci,29 it did represent the two
2 For an early discussion of the theory of policy analysis in general, see Cavers, supra,

note 3.

Note 15 supra. See also Hancock, " In the Parishof St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward
of Cheap," 16 STAN. L. REV. 561 (1964); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37
TEXAS L. REV. 657 (1959).
24 Comments on Babcock

v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Law, 63

COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963).
21Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
2 The state court may also risk violating the equal protection clause by failing to
enforce its own law where it is the state with the predominant interests. Hancock, AntiGuest Statutes and MaritalImmunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 1 DALHOUS1E L.J. 105,
140-46 (1973).
' See note 15 supra. The governmental interest theory makes a distinction between
a true conflicts case-both states have an interest in carrying out their policy-and a
pseudo-conflicts case-examination shows only one state to have any interest in applying
its law. Interest analysis is necessary only in the "true" conflicts situation.
12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 750.

See also Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 267 (1966); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts,48 CORNELL
L.Q. 215 (1963).
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leading alternatives to the mechanical place of the wrong rule,
i.e., the Restatement Second's "most significant contacts" and
the governmental interests policy approach. Because the New
York court invoked both rules and policy language, the Babcock
decision was a hybrid on the continuum between the inexorable
traditional rule of lex loci and the best of all possible alternatives
to lex loci.30
The Colorado court confronted the issue in Rostek within this
context (or vortex) of choice of law philosophies exemplified by
Babcock v. Jackson and its opinion reflected an awareness of the
3
various options to lex loci. 1
II.

THE CHOICE OF LAW RULES SELECTED AND APPLIED IN

Rostek

In December of 1969, John Rostek and his wife, Carol, departed from Colorado for Iowa in their twin engine plane. En
route they stopped in Vermillion, South Dakota, to attend a business meeting and to spend the night. After a change in plans, the
Rosteks left that evening for Colorado from the Vermillion airport. The wreckage of their plane, in which both Rosteks were
killed, was later found at the end of the runway.32 Mr. Rostek,
who had been acting as pilot, and his wife were both Colorado
residents and their aircraft was registered in Colorado.
The guardian of Mrs. Rostek's four children filed a wrongful
death action in Colorado against the estate of the husband-pilot.
The administrator for the estate alleged that South Dakota law
governed. South Dakota's aircraft guest statute barred actions by
a guest against the host-pilot for anything less than willfull or
wanton misconduct.34 Colorado, however, has no statutory bar
against an aircraft guest's claims. Since the parties stipulated
that "at most" the plaintiff could show simple negligence by John
The comprehensiveness of Babcock made it susceptible to being adopted by all of
the various schools of approach. In a footnote to Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 588, 249
N.E.2d 394, 406, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 535 (1969), Judge Burke, concurring, noted:
[Pirofessor Cheatham gave great emphasis to our discussion of the concepts
of "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts." . . . Professor Currie
believed that the court adopted his theory of "governmental interests."...
Professor Ehrenzweig interpreted the decision as valuable support for his
theory of applying "the law of the state where the insured car is permanently
kept." . . . Professors Cavers, Leflar and Reese were unable to agree with
any of the above-mentioned views.
" See the Colorado Supreme Court's reference to the various commentators' theories,
514 P.2d at 318 nn.4 & 5.
11 Id. at 315.
Id. at 319.
S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. § 50-13-15 (1967).
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Rostek, 3 it was crucial to determine whether South Dakota or
Colorado law governed. The opportunity to determine the choice
of applicable law was presented when the Colorado Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The trial court had granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment based on the traditional mechanical rule:
The law in Colorado is that the claim is governed by lex loci
delicti, rather than lex fori. Pando v. Jasper [133 Colo. 321], 295
P.2d 229 and Bannowsky v. Krauser, [D.C.], 294 F. Supp. 1204.36

Acknowledging that lex loci appeared in Colorado law "more
by default than by design,"37 the supreme court in a detailed,
documented analysis reversed the trial court and remanded for a
proceeding consistent with its views.
Chief Justice Pringle's opinion represented a step-by-step
analysis-with each step thoughtfully, even gingerly, taken-in
opting for an alternative to lex loci. The cases relied on by the
defendant were distinguished as assuming without questioning
lex loci 3 1 or as being a district court decision not binding on state
appellate courts. 39 Other Colorado cases were characterized as
similarly without precedential effect.4"
Finding no stare decisis barriers, the court noted that lex loci
was a disintegrating doctrine, overruled by many state courts and
criticized by most conflict of laws authorities." While the consensus was that a mechanical deference to the law of the place of the
wrong was no longer viable, there were differing opinions as to
what should be substituted. The Colorado decision alluded to
theories emphasizing the lex fori approach or the law of the
forum,42 the expectation of the parties,4 3 and the governmental
interests considerations." The Rostek decision criticized these
theories as "approaches" requiring ad hoc adjudication rather
1 514 P.2d at 315.
39

Id.

Id.
Pando v. Jasper, 133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956). This is the only Colorado case
to mention expressly lex loci.
3g Bannowsky v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Colo. 1969).
I" See, e.g., Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Warring, 37 Colo. 122, 86 P. 305 (1906); Atchison,
T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1887).
514 P.2d at 318.
42 As an example of the lex loci approach in contrast with other theories, see
Ehrenzweig, supra, note 20.
13 Reese, Conflicts of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
679, 691 (1963).
" Note 15 supra.
37

31
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than leading to a comprehensive solution. Whereas a constant
rule provides a predetermined means for resolving the same issue
even though the facts may vary from case to case, an interests
analysis approach requires individual analysis of each issue
within the factual context of a specific case.
The court acknowledged that it sought a rational and equitable approach rooted in predictability and uniformity of result.' 5
To end this quest, the court turned to the New York decision in
Neumeier v. Kuehner.1" In that opinion, Chief Judge Fuld
brought three precise rules for choice of law determinations from
the relative obscurity of his concurring opinion in Tooker v.
Lopez47 to the dignity of a majority rule in Neumeier. The Colorado court accepted the first two principles of Neumeier as workable choice of law rules in the guest-host situation:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in
the same state, and the (vehicle) is there registered, the law of that
state should control and determine the standard of care which the
host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile
and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he
should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would
be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim's
domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his
own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come
into that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.'8

Having established what would determine the choice of law,
the Colorado court applied the facts to its selected rule. Since
both John and Carol Rostek, as host and guest, were domiciled
in Colorado and the airplane was registered in Colorado, 9 the first
principle applied. "[T]he rights and liabilities of the parties are
governed by the law of the place of domicile which in this case is
50
Colorado.,
Recognizing that the Rostek case was a "comparatively easy
11514 P.2d at 319.
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
24 N.Y.2d at 583, 249 N.E.2d 403, 301 N.Y.S.2d 531.
31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 70.
" The Colorado court changed the term "car" in the New York rules to the more
generic "vehicle." It might be questioned whether this modification makes these rules
applicable to the Rostek facts. Colorado defined "vehicle" as "any motor vehicle" in COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-2(6) (1963) which excludes "vehicles ...
that travel through the
air." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-2(2) (1963).
51 514 P.2d at 319.
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one" and that the incorporation of two explicit rules would make
subsequent similar cases "reasonably easy for lawyers and judges
to reach,"5 the court nevertheless went beyond the Rostek facts
and extended its decision to all multistate tort controversies. In
dictum fashioned to thwart any resort to ad hoc decisionmaking,
the court announced that tort situations outside the adopted
Neumeier principles would be decided by applying the law of the
state with the "most significant relationship" as defined and explained by section 145, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
2
Laws. 1
The Colorado Supreme Court abandoned lex loci for the
"more flexible choice of law rules" of (1) the first two Neumeier
principles for host-guest relationships and (2) section 145 of the
Restatement Second for all other multistate tort controversies.

III.

Rostek

THE

DECISION AS REPRESENTATIVE OF GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS ANALYSIS

Although it sought and announced rules, the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion can be viewed as an interest analysis decision. This is apparent from the court's language and references,
the Neumeier and Restatement Second rules selected, and the
available rules not selected.
Language of the Opinion

A.

The court summarized its criticism of the traditional rule by
stating that if lex loci were applied in Rostek, it would be heedless
"of the interests of the states involved or the expectations of the
parties. This we refuse to do." 3 Although discontented with lex
loci, the court sought replacement of the old rule with concrete
guidelines.5 4 As between rules and an ad hoc approach, rules
seemed to assure "predictability of result and uniformity of application."55

The Rostek decision specifically referred to rules, but the
language indicated a strong bias toward the interest approach.
The Neumeier decision was attractive because it "embodies the
11Id. at
52

320.

Id.

Id. at 318.
' Since the fact patterns of Rostek and Neumeier differ (in Rostek host and guest
had a common state of domicile but in Neumeier they had different domiciles), the
Colorado court was obviously concerned with reaching the Neumeier rules or it would
have turned to a case more in point such as Wessling v. Paris,417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967)
or Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
514 P.2d at 318.
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rational underpinnings of the newer approaches to choice of law
problems, emphasizing the expectations of the parties and the
interests of the different jurisdictions involved.""6
In incorporating section 145 to resolve nonhost/guest controversies, the rule aspects of the Restatement Second were deemphasized. The court underscored not the "contacts" element but
the determination of the state with the "most significant relationship." Special attention was given to the Restatement's consideration of the issues, the nature of the tort, and the purposes of the
competing tort rules involved. 57 The court approved the policy
analysis factors of section 145 rather than its static rules.
Additionally, it is notable that secondary sources referred to
in the opinion either stressed an interest analysis approach' s or
criticized mechanical rule alternatives to lex loci."
The Rules Selected

B.

FirstNational Bank v. Rostek delineated choice of law rules,
but these rules incorporated a consideration of competing state
interests. Undertones in the opinion suggest that the court was
concerned with providing an interests analysis. A close examination of the Neumeier and Restatement rules which were adopted
seems to support this observation.
Colorado relied upon Neumeier v. Kuehner to govern the
factual pattern presented by the Rostek case. Neumeier, unlike
the Rostek situation, involved a host and guest from different
domiciles (host-New York, guest-Canada) who were involved
in an accident in Ontario. Ontario had a guest statute, New York
did not. Chief Judge Fuld prefaced his guidelines with the caveat
that Neumeier, relying on a series of governmental interest decisions of the New York court since Babcock, was both a culmination and clarification of these previous opinions.10 Although policy
analysis was contrary to rule formulation, the court's past attenId. at 319.
Id. at 320.
See, in particular, id. at 318 nn.4 & 5 where the court refers to articles by Leflar,
Currie, Traynor, and Weintraub, all of whom favor governmental interests or policy approaches.
" The references which Rostek made to commentaries on the Restatement Second
are predominantly critical, perhaps indicating the court's basic discomfort with the
Restatement. The articles by Currie and Ehrenzweig are critical of the Restatement position and are noted in the comments to section 145. The Colorado court included these
references in footnotes 4 and 5 of its opinion rather than in footnoted discussions more
favorable to the Restatement Second.
11 31 N.Y.2d at 127-28, 286 N.E.2d 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d 69.
'7
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tion to New York interests in automobile guest statute cases allowed the court to suggest three narrow principles to guide future
decisions. Colorado incorporated two of these principles and decided Rostek according to the first one.
Some commentators characterized the Neumeier opinion as
a retreat from the full-bodied interest approach of earlier New
York decisions. Yet these critics agreed that the first principle
which Chief Judge Fuld propounded and the one which Colorado
employed to decide Rostek represented a "pure interest" approach.' Fuld's rules were not diluted interest analysis. The first
two principles codified previously considered New York interests
without attempting to predetermine future policy." The first
principle of Neumeier, which became the rule for Rostek, was
founded on recognized state interests.
The New York principles which granted recovery in Babcock
and denied recovery in Neumeier are viable in Colorado because
they encourage analysis of the respective competing states' inter3
ests.
Interest analysis requires that the court consider the policies
which underlie the competing state laws. Because of the guest
statutes involved, discerning state policies in the Rostek case was
not particularly difficult. Colorado has recently upheld its automobile guest statute barring claims for any negligence less than
willful and wanton. 4 South Dakota's vehicular guest statute is
similar. 5 The policy against extending a similar limitation to air
situations is also clear. Colorado statutes do not include an aircraft guest law, expressly defining "motor vehicle" to exclude
"vehicles that travel through the air." 6 The legislature carefully
precluded any back door attempt to apply the motor vehicle guest
statute to airplane accidents.
Colorado's policy is to protect fully the rights of aircraft
guests by not limiting a host-pilot's liability. South Dakota, on
the other hand, articulated its policy of restricting guests' rights
, Symposium, Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 104
(1973).
See Traynor, supra note 23 at 667.
"3Even if Colorado were to abrogate its guest statute, the Neumeier rules would still
carry out Colorado policy, because the rules merely assure evaluation of policy.
" See the exhaustive consideration of the Colorado guest statute, upholding its constitutionality, in Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960).
" S.D. CoMPnLn LAWS ANN. § 32-34-1 (1967).
" See the discussion of statutory definitions, supra note 48.
"
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and limiting pilot liability. In confronting these conflicting policies, the Colorado court properly chose to enforce Colorado's interests over those of South Dakota. The first principle of
Neumeier allowed Colorado to maintain its well-established policy in this area.
By implementing New York guidelines, Colorado could balance competing state interests to protect Colorado's overriding
policies but defer to another state's more significant interest
when necessary. A not improbable hypothetical illustrates this.
Husband and Wife are Colorado domiciliaries and their car
is registered in Colorado. While H is driving in California with W,
he takes Guest, a California domiciliary, for a ride which ends in
a collision caused by H's simple negligence. Suits are filed in
Colorado by both W and G on the issue of H's liability. As noted,
Colorado has an automobile guest statute, but California recently
declared its guest statute unconstitutional."7
As between H and W, who have a common domicile and a
vehicle registered in that state, the Rostek rule (i.e., the first
principle of Neumeier) applies. Colorado law governs and W will
be prevented from recovering against H. As between H and G,
however, the second Neumeier principle adopted by Colorado
governs and requires the application of California law to permit
G's recovery. Since G was injured in his own domiciliary state,
without a guest recovery limitation, H is prohibited from interposing his state's host-guest law as a defense.
Application of the Rostek rules results in Colorado's denying
recovery to the Wife while preserving the liability of the Husband
to the Guest, the party without Colorado contacts. Both Colorado's policy of protecting its drivers and California's policy of
protecting its guests have been preserved without creating an
unexpected boon to or unexpected hardship on any party. 8
The selected Neumeier rules are premised on giving weight
to state interests, regardless of the particular nature of those interests. Colorado's acceptance of Chief Judge Fuld's guidelines
appears to affirm the interest analysis.
The Restatement Second has been praised and criticized as
the injection of manageable rules into choice of law problems. It
7

Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212 (1973).

" See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 580, 249 N.E.2d 394, 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519,
528 (1969). Different liabilities from the same accident are not an aberration of choice of
law rules, but they are an anomaly of the federal system as well.
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is significant that section 145, as adopted by Colorado, evidences
a strong tendency toward interests analysis.
Before locating the "most significant relationship," section
145 requires a consideration of policies with reference to section
6 guidelines. Section 6 not only itemizes important factors to be
considered in all policy approaches, but it closely approximates
the governmental interest theory. 9 When section 145 is properly
utilized, policy assessments precede "contacts" counting.
The Restatement Second in conjunction with the first two
Neumeier rules assures that interest analysis will be incorporated
in tort choice of law questions in Colorado. The Neumeier rules
were formulated on the basis of policy considerations and section
145 of the Restatement seems to require such policy exploration.
The Restatement view, as adopted by Colorado, applies only
to nonhost/guest cases. If neither state has a guest statute, there
is probably not a true conflict.70 Counting of contacts then would
indicate the "most significant" state and appropriate choice of
law. But the result is likely to be the same as lex loci because of
the Restatement's emphasis on the place of injurious "contact.",
If either state or both states have guest statutes, a Colorado
forum will apply the Neumeier rules. The Rostek decision demonstrates that application of the first Neumeier principle preserves
recognized state interests. This rule gives effect to the law of the
domiciliary state where contacts under the Restatement would be
balanced.7 2 Any attempt. to circumvent state interests or to give
one contact excessive weight is avoided by making Neumeier determinative.
Where contacts would not be balanced because host and
guest were not domiciliaries of the same state, the second
Neumeier principle applies to preserve the superior state interest.
The rules, because they are centered on an "interests" axis, preclude an inappropriate application of "contacts" where state policy has been formulated.
0 Juenger, supra, note 9, at 213 (footnote omitted): "Section 6(2) of the new Restatement incorporated in section 145 by reference, and the discussion in the comments following that section reflect the terminology and thinking of interest analysis."
7oSupra note 27.
" Section 145's continuing deference to the law of the place of the wrong has been
noted by various commentators. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 10 at 226; Comment,
The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CAIIF. L. REv. 762, 777 (1963).
12 In Rostek, the places of injury and of the wrong were both South Dakota, but the
domicile and the origin of relationship of the parties were in Colorado.
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According to the court's decision, multistate tort situations
not within the Neumeier pattern are to be resolved by reference
to section 145 of the Restatement. Such cases will be conflicts
where state policy may not be readily ascertainable. Preliminary
reference of an issue to section 6 requires judicial recognition of
possible state interests. Even these difficult cases are to be considered initially in a policy approach framework, through section
6, to begin defining the extent of state interests.
The interplay between Neumeier and the Restatement
Second secures both the priority of state interests where that
interest has been recognized, and the analysis of state policy
where such interests have not yet been challenged.
C.

Rules Not Selected

The rule not selected by the Colorado Supreme Court also
reveals the court's interest analysis preference. Chief Judge
Fuld's opinion presented three guidelines and the Neumeier facts
made the third principle controlling:
In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled
in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally,
the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the
accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that
normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law
purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
3
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.1

Reference to this policy standard led the court to rule that
"the plaintiff has failed to show that this State's connection with
the controversy was sufficient to justify displacing the rule of lex
loci delictus."7 4
Since the Colorado court was eager to establish choice of law
rules, it is curious that the court avoided this third standard and
referred instead to section 145 which Rostek explicitly adopted.
There are two possible explanations for this avoidance. First, the
narrow holding in Neumeier found that Ontario law governed
-the same result as under lex loci. However, in abandoning the
traditional rule, Colorado sought to avoid any method that might
circuitously terminate at its original point of departure, i.e., lex
loci.
Secondly, the court repeatedly stressed the need for concrete
guidelines. Chief Judge Fuld's third principle was broad enough
'

31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 70.
Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 71.
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to allow interest considerations, but it did not provide any basis
for such an analysis. Only a court skilled in interest considerations could wisely manipulate such an imprecise policy approach.
However, adopting section 6 (through section 145) of the
Restatement would provide a surer basis for systematic interest
analysis.
The Colorado court obviously did not rely exclusively on the
Restatement Second. Rostek was itself decided on the basis of the
predetermined guidelines of Neumeier.
If the court had applied section 145 to Rostek, the facts might
have compelled the court to reach a different result-South Dakota's law may have prevailed. To identify the state with the
"most significant relationship," the court would have considered
each state's contacts with the occurrence and perhaps found them
balanced. The comments to the Restatement section stress that
only with rare exception will a law other than that of the place of
injury and wrong be the most significant." Willis Reese, the
Restatement Second reporter, described the contacts evaluation
approach as little more than lex loci "in modern apparel." ' ,
Therefore, the probable application of section 145 would have led
the Colorado court to South Dakota law. The court would be
obliged either to manipulate section 145 to avoid South Dakota
law, or to accede to the Restatement's choice of South Dakota
law. By adopting the Neumeier rules, rather than the
Restatement view, for the Rostek facts, the court avoided either
unacceptable alternative.
Colorado's adoption of the first two Neumeier guidelines,
and of section 145 for all fact situations not covered by the
Neumeier principles, resulted in a decision in which interest analysis plays a greater role than is initially apparent. Individually,
the Neumeier rules and section 145 are choice of law rules, but
together they preserve the governmental interests approach in
three ways: state interests previously articulated are codified,
interest considerations once established are not ignored, and interests not previously analyzed are referred to policy guidelines
without a binding result.
IV.

THE EFFECT OF THE

Rostek RULES

ON SUBSEQUENT CHOICE OF

LAW QUESTIONS IN COLORADO

Rostek's interest analysis background will have an impact on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Reese, supra note 43.

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

145(2), comments d & e (1969).
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future conflicts questions. Cases within the ambit of the
Neumeier rules protect Colorado's expressed interests while other
tort situations are assured careful interest consideration through
application of the Restatement Second.
The most satisfying aspect of Rostek is that the court
achieved what it sought. Colorado is no longer obliged by precedent to apply lex loci. The court laid to rest the place of the wrong
as an absolute standard and replaced it with definitive, though
flexible, guidelines. The Colorado court's ultimate goal for uniformity and predictability of result made it doubtful, absent such
choice of law rules, that the court would have abandoned lex loci.
Coordination of Neumeier and the Restatement Second preserved
the primacy of state interests without requiring an ad hoc determination of every choice of law problem.
A difficulty of the Rostek decision is that what the court did
so clearly, it did too subtly." Chief Justice Pringle's decision
never directly acknowledged a predilection for interest analysis.
Even though the court's reasoning and results were consistent
with a governmental interest approach, the opinion only obliquely referred to this basis. There is a danger that the Rostek
rules alone, without perceptive analysis, will result in the mere
counting of relevant contacts.
Furthermore, the opinion failed to point out the reference to
section 6 made by section 145 of the Restatement Second. The
court's analysis of the Restatement manifests the implicit interconnection between the two sections which the court recognized.
But the court should have mentioned explicitly the relevant interest principles of the Restatement which its own analysis employed78 and which a proper use of the "most significant relationship" theory requires. To prevent emphasis on the place of the
wrong, the court might have explained the horizontal relationship
79
between the two Restatement sections.
Finally, the emphasis on ad hoc adjudication foreclosed the
71 In fact, the Colorado court followed the same practice it deplored by other courts
"making a choice of law decision without exposing the real choice of law influencing
factors for objective classification and criticism." 514 P.2d at 317.
" Lest this commentary on the Colorado court's adeptness in handling new choice of
law solutions seem too harsh, it should be noted that the court is in good company. Currie
described as "without perception" the conflicts decisions of Cardozo, Holmes, Hand,
Brandeis, and Black. Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv.
719 (1961).
' See Weintraub, supra note 29.
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advantages available from an approach based purely on policy."s
Evolving general rules only after deciding cases enables a court
to modify outdated state laws to reflect local changes in social
policy. A pure policy approach would permit local law and local
policy to develop harmoniously and contemporaneously.
Rostek is, however, the Colorado choice of laws rule for torts
and its interest analysis background can affect subsequent cases
in several ways.
First, to obtain the full benefit of interest analysis, practitioners must precisely and comprehensively define the issues in
each case."' Cases can be decided consistently with state policy
only when the involved policy is identified, and that policy is
recognizable only when the issue is correctly articulated. Perceptively and carefully presenting a conflict question in terms of its
underlying issue will enable a court to recognize the relevant
policy and to act to protect that policy. The outcome of a case
may ultimately depend upon the initial characterization of the
82
essential issue.
Secondly, multistate tort problems must be presented to the
court in terms of relevant facts, competing state interests, and
pertinent' Colorado policy. Rostek illustrated this technique by
setting forth the important facts, contrasting the South Dakota
and Colorado guest statutes, and recognizing Colorado's interest
in not limiting an airplane guest's recovery. Extensive explanation in future cases will safeguard against a mechanical reference
to Restatement "contacts." A policy-rooted conflicts rule, as developed in Rostek, requires more initial analysis by both judge
and counsel, but it results in decisions in furtherance, rather than
in frustration, of state policy.
A third effect of Rostek is an apparent requirement that
briefs and oral arguments place emphasis on interest factors
which Rostek considered but did not articulate. It seems important to emphasize consideration of the Restatement section 6
policy principles before the "significant contacts" are identified.
11Curiously, a court's choice of rules over a straight policy approach leads to less
flexibility. See Hancock, supra note 23; Traynor, supra note 23.
" Insight into the nature of the problem to be solved will determine the sensibility
of the solution rather than any particular rule selected. Weintraub, supra note 29, at 249.
An issue which centers on the relationship between the parties may be decided
quite differently, under the same facts, than an issue which focuses on a party's standard
of conduct. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 482-84, 191 N.E.2d 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d
750-51.

1974

CONFLICT OF LAWS IN

COLORADO

The more frequently the court engages in this policy determination prior to rule application, the more natural it will become.
State interest analysis should and will be an inherent part of
every choice of law decision.
Finally, the Rostek opinion suggests that conflicts cases
should be directed toward framing useful rules for choice of law.
The Colorado Supreme Court opted for an interest approach
bounded by concrete guidelines.8 3 Practitioners litigating multistate torts must demonstrate that policy analysis is operable
within a framework of rules or the innovations of Rostek will be
short lived.
CONCLUSION

In First National Bank v. Rostek the Colorado Supreme
Court abandoned the mechanistic lex loci doctrine and sought a
choice of law system guaranteeing certainty, ease of application,
and flexibility. The court combined host-guest rules from
Neumeier v. Kuehner with principles in section 145 of the
Restatement Second to produce an interests analysis approach
buttressed by concrete rules.
This amalgam of policy evaluation and rules represents the
emergence of an operable system of governmental interest analysis easily manageable by courts who may be hesitant to adjudicate conflicts on an ad hoc basis. In allowing and requiring policy
assessment and reference to competing state interests, the Rostek
decision is not necessarily a uniform, predictable, and totally
consistent panacea to all subsequent choice of law problems. Properly utilized, the Rostek analytical approach will achieve exactly what a court seeks: protection of the parties' and of the
states' dominant interests. Ineptly employed, the Rostek rules
can become as rigid, inconsistent, and inequitable as lex loci.
11The desirability of this more particular specification of policy factors was suggested
in Leflar, supra note 29.

